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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 24, 1997, a jury in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania found the defendant, Melvin Robinson, guilty 
of conspiring to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 846 contrary to 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). 
After conducting a hearing, the district court sentenced 
Robinson to the mandatory 20-year minimum term 
required by 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(C) ("section 841(b)(1)(C)") 
when "death or serious bodily injury results from the use 
of" the substance the defendant was convicted of 
distributing. 
 
On appeal, Robinson does not challenge the jury'sfinding 
of guilt. Thus, he does not argue that the evidence did not 
support a finding that he conspired to distribute heroin. 
Instead, he argues that venue was improper, and he 
disputes the district court's imposition of the 20-year 
mandatory minimum sentence. Robinson contends in 
particular that the Western District of Pennsylvania was an 
improper venue because the jury may have convicted him 
for his participation in a conspiracy in Ohio without finding 
that he or any co-conspirator committed an overt act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. He also argues that section 841(b)(1)(C) 
requires a 20-year mandatory minimum only if a court 
finds that the distribution of the substance was in the 
common law sense the proximate cause of death or serious 
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bodily injury. Accordingly, even though Robinson 
acknowledges that a user of the heroin he supplied died 
from its use, he challenges the sentence because the 
district court did not make a finding that his conduct was 
a proximate cause of the user's death. 
 
The district court rejected Robinson's challenge to venue 
in a motion for judgment of acquittal after discharge of 
jury. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the 
district court found that Bettina Allison died of a heroin 
overdose from heroin that Robinson delivered to Ronald 
Bungar, who in turn delivered it to Allison and her boy- 
friend, Michael Minchoff. Thus, the court found that the 
20-year mandatory minimum sentence was required. 
 
We conclude that Robinson waived his objection to venue 
by failing to raise the issue before the jury reached a verdict 
and that in any event venue was proper. We further 
conclude that Congress did not intend the phrase "if death 
or serious bodily harm results from the use of such 
substance" in section 841(b)(1)(C) to require a showing that 
the defendant's distribution of the substance in a common- 
law sense proximately caused a death. Moreover, we hold 
that the court's well-supported findings show that there 
was a sufficient nexus between the substance and the 
death to require the imposition of the mandatory minimum 
sentence. In the circumstances, we will affirm.1 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Factual History 
 
On November 29, 1995, Melvin Robinson sold three- 
eighths of a gram of heroin to Ronald Bungar in 
Youngstown, Ohio. Robinson was a long-time heroin addict, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742, 
and the district court had original jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 
S 3231. Although Robinson also challenges the district court's finding of 
"relevant conduct," and argues that a failure to read a proximate cause 
requirement into the text of section 841(b)(1)(C) would violate various 
constitutional provisions, we only will discuss his venue and proximate 
cause arguments since we find that these other contentions clearly lack 
merit. 
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who over the years had cultivated a relationship with a 
group of addicts from Greenville, Pennsylvania, including 
Bungar and Michael Minchoff. Often one addict would 
make the 45-minute trip from Greenville to Youngstown for 
a small amount of heroin to share with or sell to another 
user in Greenville. 
 
On November 29, Bungar made the trip to Robinson's 
Youngstown home with his girlfriend, Dolores Tofani. 
Bungar earlier had agreed to purchase three $20 (one- 
eighth ounce) packets of heroin for Minchoff and his 
girlfriend, Bettina Allison. Once his guests arrived, 
Robinson left the house to purchase a small amount of 
heroin for Bungar that Bungar then shared with Tofani and 
Robinson. Later, Bungar purchased three packets of heroin 
for Minchoff from Robinson. Bungar delivered these three 
packets to Minchoff and Allison when he returned to 
Greenville. 
 
While Bungar and Tofani were at Allison's apartment, 
Allison began preparing for injection the heroin Bungar had 
bought from Robinson. Meanwhile, Minchoff injected a 
"speed-ball"2 from Robinson's heroin and some cocaine 
Bungar had obtained earlier. After about 15 minutes, 
Bungar and Tofani left Allison's apartment and they never 
saw Allison or Minchoff alive again. Bettina Allison died of 
a heroin overdose sometime between 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 
a.m. on November 30, 1995, and Minchoff died of a heroin 
overdose sometime later that day or within the next few 
days. 
 
B. Procedural history 
 
On April 16, 1997, a grand jury in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania indicted Robinson for conspiring to 
distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846 and 21 
U.S.C. S 841. Robinson was arrested in Ohio and was 
transported to the Western District of Pennsylvania where 
he was arraigned and counsel was appointed to represent 
him. A jury trial began on July 21, 1997, and at the close 
of the government's case, Robinson unsuccessfully orally 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A "speed-ball" is the street term for the often dangerous mixture of 
equal parts cocaine and heroin. 
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moved for judgment of acquittal in a motion which did not 
challenge venue. On July 24, 1997, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. On July 29, 1997, Robinson moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on the grounds, insofar as germane 
here, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case 
because of the alleged venue defect. The district court 
denied the motion on July 31, 1997. 
 
The court held sentencing hearings on April 16, 1998, 
and May 7, 1998. It concluded that Robinson distributed 
heroin that resulted in Allison's, but not Minchoff 's, death. 
Thus, section 841(b)(1)(C) required a mandatory minimum 
20-year sentence which the court accordingly imposed by 
reason of Allison's death. While the court determined that 
the applicable sentencing range was 235-293 months under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in view of its imposition 
of the 20-year sentence the range was not material. 
 
Inasmuch as the court's findings and conclusions at the 
sentencing hearing are important we quote them at length: 
 
       One: Defendant engaged in a conspiracy with other 
       persons, including Ronald Bungar, from on or about 
       November 29th, 1995, to on or about November 30, 
       1995, to distribute and possess with the intent to 
       distribute less than 100 grams of a mixture and 
       substance containing a detectable amount of heroin. 
 
       Two: Defendant on multiple occasions prior to 
       November 29, 1995, had delivered drugs to Bungar, 
       which drugs were delivered to others in Defendant's 
       presence. 
 
       Three: During the operation of the conspiracy, 
       Defendant obtained heroin from an unknown source 
       and co-conspirator in Ohio which Defendant delivered 
       to Bungar. 
 
       Four: The heroin obtained by Bungar from Defendant 
       was of high purity. 
 
       Five: During the operation of the conspiracy, 
       Defendant and Bungar and Dolores Tofani used a 
       portion of the drugs delivered while at the Defendant's 
       residence and in Defendant's presence. 
 
                                5 
  
       Six: During the operation of the conspiracy, Bungar 
       and Tofani, with the Defendant's knowledge, left the 
       Defendant's residence with some of the heroin that 
       Bungar had obtained from Defendant. And Bungar 
       delivered part of that heroin to Bettina Allison and 
       Michael Minchoff at Allison's apartment in Greenville, 
       Pennsylvania. 
 
       Seven: Bungar and Tofani remained at Allison's 
       apartment for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. 
 
       Eight: During that 10- to 15-minute period, Minchoff 
       injected some of the heroin in, quote, speed ball, 
       unquote, form. That is, combined with cocaine while in 
       the presence of Bungar and Tofani. 
 
       Nine: During the aforementioned 10- to 15-minute 
       period, Bungar and Tofani observed Allison preparing 
       some of the heroin in question for injection. 
 
       Ten: Based upon their previous drug dealings, it was 
       reasonably foreseeable to Defendant that Bungar would 
       deliver these drugs to others. 
 
       Eleven: The delivery of the heroin by Bungar to 
       Minchoff and Allison was in furtherance of the 
       conspiracy of which Defendant was a member, within 
       the scope of the Defendant's agreement and reasonably 
       foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the 
       Defendant agreed to undertake. 
 
       Twelve: Allison was never seen alive again after 
       Bungar and Tofani left her apartment in the early 
       morning hours of November 30, 1995. 
 
       Thirteen: Various persons spoke with Minchoff over 
       the telephone on November 30, 1995. 
 
       Fourteen: Michael Minchoff was seen alive 
       throughout the day and early evening of November 30, 
       1995, in Greenville, Pennsylvania. 
 
       Fifteen: On December 2nd, 1995, officers with the 
       Greenville-West Salem police department, responding to 
       reports that Allison had missed two consecutive 
       workdays without reporting, found the bodies of Allison 
       and Minchoff in Allison's apartment. 
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       Sixteen: The approximate time of the death of Allison 
       was between 1 a.m. and 5:15 a.m. on November 30th, 
       1995; and the approximate time of death of Minchoff 
       was between 9 p.m. on November 30th, 1995, and 9:45 
       a.m. on December 2nd, 1995. 
 
       Seventeen: The December 2nd, 1995, autopsy 
       performed on the body of Allison confirmed that she 
       died from a heroin overdose and that she also had 
       cocaine, codeine, ethanol, and cannobinoids present in 
       her blood. 
 
       Eighteen: An autopsy performed on the body of 
       Minchoff on December 2nd, 1995, confirmed that he 
       also had died of a heroin overdose. 
 
       Nineteen: The death of Allison was caused by a 
       heroin overdose as a result of the heroin delivered to 
       her by Bungar during the operation of the conspiracy. 
 
       Twenty: The death of Minchoff was caused by a 
       heroin overdose resulting in whole or in part from the 
       heroin delivered to him by Bungar during the operation 
       of the conspiracy. 
 
       The Court finds that in accordance with the above 
       findings of fact, the Government has proved by clear 
       and convincing evidence that the death of Bettina 
       Allison resulted from the heroin which Defendant 
       delivered to Ronald Bungar. 
 
       With regard to the death of Michael Minchoff, 
       however, the Court finds that the Government has 
       failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
       Minchoff 's death resulted in whole or in part from the 
       heroin which Defendant delivered to Ronald Bungar. 
 
       Accordingly, the Court finds that application of the 
       death enhancement set forth in Section 2D1.1(a)(2) of 
       the United States sentencing guidelines imposing a 
       base offense level of 38 is appropriate. 
 
       Furthermore, the Court finds that Defendant is 
       subject to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 
       years in accordance with Title 21 of the United States 
       Code, Section 841(b)(1)(C). 
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Robinson filed a motion to correct the sentence on May 
8, 1998, that the court denied on May 11, 1998. This 
appeal followed. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Venue 
 
We address Robinson's venue argument first.3 On this 
point we are exercising plenary review, as we are deciding 
the point through the application of legal principles. Article 
III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, provides that 
"[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State 
where the said Crimes shall have been committed." The 
Sixth Amendment repeats this requirement: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to .. . trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed. . . ." Following these 
requirements, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
mandate that "the prosecution shall be had in a district in 
which the offense was committed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. 
Finally, Congress has provided that "any offense . . . begun 
in one district and completed in another, or committed in 
more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted 
in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, 
or completed." 18 U.S.C. S 3237. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, we have 
recognized that a defendant can waive the provision for an 
appropriate venue by not raising a timely contention that 
venue was mislaid. See United States v. Polin, 323 F.2d 
549, 556-57 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Gallagher, 183 
F.2d 342, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1950). The government argues 
that Robinson waived any objection to venue by not raising 
it before the completion of the government's case in chief. 
However, we have held that a defendant's failure to object 
before the government rests only constitutes a waiver if the 
defect in venue is clear on the face of the indictment. See 
United States v. Turley, 891 F.2d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 1989). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. While Robinson speaks in terms of a challenge to jurisdiction, clearly 
venue and not jurisdictional questions are involved here. See e.g., United 
States v. Polin, 323 F.2d 549, 556 (3d Cir. 1963). 
 
                                8 
  
Where, as here, the offense described in the indictment is 
a conspiracy that allegedly was completed in the district in 
which the government is prosecuting the defendant, a 
defect in venue may not be clear on the indictment's face, 
and would become clear only once the government rests its 
case. Therefore, we have held that "where there is a proper 
allegation of venue in the indictment, but the government 
fails to prove that allegation at trial, a challenge to venue in 
a motion for acquittal is timely." United States v. Sandini, 
803 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1986). Thus, Robinson could 
have timely objected to venue at the close of the 
government's case, and was not required to object before 
the close of the government's case. Id. 
 
Robinson contends that under Sandini he sufficiently 
preserved his objection to venue in his motion for judgment 
of acquittal five days after the jury announced its verdict. 
We, however, agree with the Courts of Appeals for the First 
and Fifth Circuits that a defendant must raise the issue of 
improper venue before the jury returns a verdict. See 
United States v. Parrish, 736 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam) ("Thus, the courts have consistently ruled that 
a claim of venue must be raised at least prior to a verdict."); 
United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 44 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(same). Therefore, by raising the issue for thefirst time 
after the jury reached a verdict, Robinson waived any 
objection to venue. 
 
However, even if we were to find that Robinson timely 
challenged venue, we would reject his argument. The 
United States can bring a prosecution in any district where 
a conspiracy was begun, continued, or completed. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3237(a). It is undisputed that Bungar delivered the 
heroin he acquired from Robinson to Minchoff and Allison 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
 
To establish a conspiracy, the evidence must show that 
the alleged conspirators shared a unity of purpose, an 
intent to achieve a common goal, and had an agreement to 
work together to achieve that goal. See United States v. 
Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 
454 (1997). Here, the evidence established that Robinson 
and Bungar had a relationship based upon the use and 
distribution of heroin. Bungar estimated at trial that 
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Robinson had sold him heroin approximately 80 or 90 
times during this relationship. After purchasing heroin from 
Robinson, Bungar sometimes finished it at Robinson's 
house but at other times he left with heroin to share with 
or sell to others in Greenville, Pennsylvania. 
 
The events of November 29, 1995, were consistent with 
Bungar's and Robinson's earlier dealings. Bungarfirst 
shared a small amount of heroin with Robinson and Tofani. 
He then purchased three more packets of heroin. Robinson 
recognized that the heroin was strong, and that Bungar's 
purchase of three more packets was consistent with an 
intent to distribute it, as Bungar had often done. Together, 
Robinson and Bungar were connected in the purpose of 
distributing heroin to others in Greenville, so that they 
could continue to supply their own needs. 
 
Finally, it is clear that the court and both parties focused 
the jury on the distinction between a conspiracy and a 
buyer/seller agreement. Both the government and Robinson 
spent considerable time explaining the difference between 
the two types of agreements, and the district court correctly 
charged the jury on the matter. In fact, the jury asked for 
and received clarification of the court's instruction 
regarding a buyer/seller agreement. In view of all the 
circumstances, it is clear that the government established 
that there were overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania so venue properly 
was laid there. 
 
B. The "results from" language of sectio n 841(b)(1)(C) 
 
Our review of a district court's rulings on sentencing 
matters concerning the interpretation of a statute requiring 
a mandatory minimum sentence is plenary. See United 
States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, 
we exercise plenary review because, notwithstanding 
Robinson's challenge to the sentence, he concedes "that 
clear and convincing evidence proves that but for the use of 
heroin that Robinson delivered to Bungar, Allison would 
not have died." Br. at 15. Robinson argues that for section 
841(b)(1)(C) and what he contends are the relevant 
sentencing guideline provisions to apply, the government 
needs to show that his conduct was the proximate cause of 
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Allison's death. Robinson asks us to remand to the district 
court for resentencing using this standard. 
 
We have two preliminary observations on the sentencing 
issue. First, it is not clear to us why the district court's 
findings with respect to Minchoff led it to conclude that the 
mandatory minimum sentence was not applicable by 
reason of his death. Second, even though the government 
does not contend that the district court made a proximate 
cause finding with respect to Allison's death, it seems to us 
that its findings certainly came quite close to satisfying that 
standard. Nevertheless, we take the case on the basis the 
parties present it, that only Allison's death is involved and 
proximate cause was not established. 
 
Although we have not decided the sentencing issue, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. 
Patterson, 38 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1994), held that section 
841(b)(1)(C) imposes no "reasonable foreseeability of death" 
requirement. 38 F.3d at 145.4 In the circumstances, there 
can be no question but that if we adopt Robinson's position 
we must reject Patterson. 
 
Patterson held that the "plain language" of section 
841(b)(1)(C) neither requires nor indicates that a district 
court must find that death resulting from the use of a drug 
distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable 
event. Id. The court explained that the"statute puts drug 
dealers and users on clear notice that their sentences will 
be enhanced if people die from using the drugs they 
distribute. . . . Where serious bodily injury or death results 
from the distribution of certain drugs, Congress has elected 
to enhance a defendant's sentence regardless of whether 
the defendant knew or should have known that death 
would result." Patterson, 38 F.3d at 145. The Patterson 
court then explained that it would "not second-guess this 
unequivocal choice." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court declined to decide whether section 841(b)(1)(C) includes an 
intervening or superseding cause exception to the application of its 
enhancement since it upheld the district court'sfinding that there was 
no intervening or superseding cause of death. Id. at 146. There was no 
intervening or superseding cause here either. 
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We will not either. After all, our role is to "give effect to 
Congress's intent." Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, 
Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998). Where, as here, 
Congress' language is "plain and unambiguous," we simply 
apply the language of the statute as written. Here, the 
conspiracy was to distribute heroin. Thus, Robinson was 
subject "to the same penalties as those prescribed for the 
offense, the commission of which was the object of the . . . 
conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. S 846. Under section 841(b)(1)(C), in 
a distribution of heroin case "if death or serious bodily 
injury results from the use of such substance" a minimum 
20-year sentence was required. 
 
It is absolutely clear under the district court's 
unassailable findings that, in the course of the conspiracy 
Robinson delivered the drugs to Bungar, and that in 
furtherance of the conspiracy Bungar delivered the drugs to 
Allison. It was reasonably foreseeable to Robinson that 
Bungar would deliver the drugs to someone else, and it is 
indisputable that Allison's death was, in the words of the 
district court, "caused by a heroin overdose as a result of 
the heroin delivered to her by Bungar during the operation 
of the conspiracy." In the circumstances, it would be 
sophistry to say that Allison's death did not result from the 
use of the heroin delivered pursuant to the conspiracy. 
 
Robinson relies on Chief Judge Becker's concurring and 
dissenting opinion in United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 
1104, amended, 79 F.3d 14 (3d Cir. 1995), to argue that 
the statutory language is ambiguous. In interpreting the 
sentencing guidelines, Judge Becker stated that"the plain 
meaning of `resulted from' connotes causation" and that 
"[t]he notion of causation runs throughout the law -- 
including the criminal law -- and it is generally understood 
to encompass two concepts. A defendant's conduct 
generally must be both the `cause in fact' and the 
`proximate cause' of some harm before liability is imposed." 
Id. at 1115, 1119. In this case, however, unlike in Neadle, 
we are not dealing with the application of intricate 
provisions of the sentencing guidelines to calculate a 
financial loss. Rather, we are applying a statute dealing 
with a discrete problem, the distribution of controlled 
substances, products which Congress recognized will in 
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some cases cause death or serious bodily injury. In short, 
Congress recognized that the risk is inherent in the product 
and thus it provided that persons who distribute it do so at 
their peril. It is obvious Congress intended in such a case 
that the 20-year mandatory minimum would apply if death 
or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the 
substance without regard for common law proximate cause 
concepts.5 
 
In reaching our result, we point out that the sentencing 
guidelines have limited relevancy here. While it is true that 
the court established a guidelines range and imposed a 
sentence within that range, in fact the court fixed the 
sentence without regard for that range as it imposed the 
statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 
 
We also observe that U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(3), which 
Robinson cites, is completely consistent with our result. 
Under that section, relevant conduct with respect to factors 
determining sentencing range include all "harm that 
resulted from the acts and omissions specified" in U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) includes as relevant 
conduct in a "jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . 
whether or not charged as a conspiracy[ ] all reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of 
the jointly undertaken criminal activity." Here, of course, 
Bungar's distribution of the heroin to a third party was not 
merely reasonably foreseeable by Robinson. After all, the 
evidence we describe above shows that Robinson intended 
that it be distributed for its distribution was the very 
purpose of the conspiracy. To the extent, therefore, that 
section 1B1.3(a)(3) is implicated here, there can be no 
doubt that it is satisfied. 
 
We recognize that in some cases it is possible that the 
death or serious bodily injury which "results from the use 
of a [controlled] substance" may be so remote a 
consequence from the criminal conduct of the defendant 
with respect to the substance that a court might conclude 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We are not concerned here with cases calculating the total quantity of 
drugs in a conspiracy attributable to a particular defendant. See e.g., 
United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1992). There is no 
question but that Robinson was the source of the heroin involved here. 
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that it would not be consistent with congressional intent to 
apply the mandatory 20-year minimum sentence. Wherever, 
if anywhere, that line might be is of no concern to us now. 
In this case, Robinson conspired to distribute the heroin 
and a person to whom it almost immediately was 
distributed consumed it and died as a result. Surely, here 
the mandatory minimum sentence is applicable. 
Accordingly, this case does not require us to consider 
whether there is or should be a principled way to limit the 
application of section 841(b)(1)(C) when cause in fact is 
established. 
 
In this regard, we reiterate that the district court's 
findings in this case came close to satisfying a proximate 
cause standard. Indeed, if they did not, it was only because 
the court did not make a finding that it was foreseeable 
that Allison or another consumer of the heroin might suffer 
death or serious bodily injury from it. Yet, it cannot have 
been the intent of Congress to require such a finding as a 
condition of a mandatory minimum sentence being 
applicable under sections 841(b)(1)(C), for surely what 
concerned Congress was the inherent risk from the use of 
controlled substances. Plainly, if we read a particularized 
foreseeability requirement into that section, we would limit 
the applicability of the section significantly and frustrate 
Congress' intent. If section 841(b)(1)(C) is not to be applied 
as presently written, Congress and not this court should 
narrow its application. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction and 
sentence will be affirmed. 
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